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ABSTRACT
 
The literature on agency costs has established that the introduction of 
outside equity results in conflicts betl.een ne1,7 mmers and management that 
lO1,7ers the value of the firm. In contrast, this paper, by focusing on 
management-labor conflicts, demonstrates that the value of the firm can be 
increased by the introduction of outside equity. We obtain this result by 
sho1,7ing that the bargaining position of the o1,7ner-manager is enhanced 1,7hen 
outside equity is increased. As a result, 1,7orkers with firm-specific skills are 
persuaded to accept a lm.er 1,7age, and hence the value of the firm increases. 
OWNERSIlIP STRUCTURE, VALUE OF TilE FIRM,
 
AND TIlE BARGAINING POWER OF TIlE MANAGER
 
I. Introduction
 
In their seminal article, Michael Jensen and William Meckling developed a 
theory of the corporate OImership structure that took into account lithe 
trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager betHeen inside and outside 
equity and debt 
'
! (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 312). Jensen and Yeckling 
concentrated on the principal-agent problem and the agency costs that arise from 
the introduction of outside equity into the firm. This Has done without any 
consideration of I~hat effects such an action might have had on the bargaining 
power of the OImer- manager III negot iating I~ages I~i th the current employees of 
the firm. 
Several years later ~Iasahiko Aoki (1980; 1984, Chapter 5) introduced a 
model of the firm that emphasized flits aspect as a quasi-permanent organization 
of stockholders and employees ll (1980, p. 600). He asserted that as a result of 
the association Hith the firm, the employees acquire skills and knoHledge that, 
I.hen combined I~i th the physical assets supplied by the stockholders, can produce 
some economic gains -- the so-called organizational rent. Such rents would not 
be possible through the employment of external factors of production (such as 
workers that have no knowledge of the workings of the firm). The organizational 
rent can be produced only through the cooperation of the stockholders (supplying 
the physical assets) and the existing employees. As such, the situation is 
tantamount to a tHo-person cooperative game, and the question becomes, hOH then 
is the organizational rent to be distributed betl~een stockholders and employees. 
Aoki proposed that the solution to this particular distribution problem could be 
accomplished by use of a bargaining process attributed to Frederik Zeuthen and 
John Harsanyi that leads to the Nash bargaining solution. 
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Implicit In Aoki's analysis was that all equity was outside equity. 
Therefore, no attent ion was given to how alternat i ve OImership structures of the 
firm affect (1) the bargaining po\.er of the manager and (2) the distribution of 
the organizational rent. One could start out with an owner-managed firm and 
examine the distribution of the organizational rent under such an o\.nership 
structure. It \wuld then be important to understand hOI. the introduct ion of 
outside equity into the f irm ~ la Jensen and ~Ieclding, \wuld affect, if at all, 
the distribution of the organizational rent. 
This paper demonstrates that the introduction of outside equity into a 
heretofore o\.ner-managed firm increases the bargaining power of a risk averse 
o\mer-manager. As a result, the employees' share in the organizational rent 
will decrease, \.hich will in turn lead to an increase in the value of the firm. 
Section II of this paper introduces a simple model of the firm that makes 
possible the explicit derivation of the organizational rent from the existing 
market conditions. In addition, Section II sets the stage for the bargaining 
process that determines the distribution of the organizational rent bet\.een 
stockholders and skilled workers. This process takes the form of negotiations 
for the determination of a wage rate for skilled workers (and, therefore, the 
capitalized value of the firm). 
The bargaining process itself, and the conditions for reaching an 
equilibrium, are described in Section III. Thereafter in Section IV, we 
conclude \.ith an examination of the introduction of outside equity, its effects 
on the manager r S bargaining pOl.er and, through that, its effects on the 
equilibrium of the bargaining process and the value of the firm. 
An Appendix contains the more technical derivations and mathematical 
proofs. 
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II. The Model 
'{e consider a firm that at period t, given the price per unit of output, 
Pt' announced at the end of last period, faces a set of outstanding orders 
representing a quantity qt for its product. The manager must decide on the 
quantity to produce, q (q ~ qt) at the given price. For purposes of simplicity, 
I;e assume al;ay the possibility of negative inventories (i. e., backlogging) or 
positive inventories, so that unfilled orders represent lost sales. l 
To introduce the concept of what Aoki (1980) refers to as organizational 
rent, \;e assume that, given the existing amount of capital, the employment of 
outside workers without firm-specific skills and knOl;ledge, at a market wage 
rate w ' enables the firm to fill outstanding orders representing the quantity o 
qo' qo < qt' of its product. Given a discount rate r, let yO represent the 
capitalized value of the firm under this policy (\~here yO > 0). 
Workers, through their association with the firm for at least one period, 
acquire firm-specific skills so that their retention by the firm, augmented by 
the possible addition of unskilled workers, will enable the firm to fill the 
entire set of outstanding orders, i.e., produce and sell qt. 
Let C(qt; \~ 0) and C(qo; w0) be the costs to the firm for produc ing 
quant it ies qt and qo' respect ively, assuming the skilled and unskilled Iwrkers 
are paid the same I~age rate wo' Then, 
represents the organizational rent that would result from the cooperation of 
skilled workers with the firm in time period t. It is further assumed that 
lIn a bargaining model the possibility of positive or negative inventories may 
alter the bargaining power of management and labor. This is not considered 
here. 
7 t > O. The skills of workers with at least one time period's experience with 
the firm are firm-specific; they cannot be used outside the firm. Therefore, if 
they seek alternative employment these workers will not be able to earn more 
than the market \~age rate \~o. As suggested in the introduction, this implies 
that the model is equivalent to a t\~o-person cooperative game and the question 
is hO\~ 7 will be distributed between skilled \wrkers and the stockholders of t 
the firm. 
To explore this question, let us suppose that the part of lit gOIng to 
skilled workers will be determined by the wage rate wt that these workers 
negotiate at the beginning of each period t I~i th the management of the firm. 
That is, w = W + u \~here u ~ o and u represents that portion of the waget o t t t 
rate received by skilled workers that emanates from the organizational ren t. As 
a consequence, given \~o and the discount rate r: the capitalized value of the 
firm can be expressed as a function of wt ' ,~ith V(I~O) representing its ma'CImum 
value, i.e., where the entire organizational rent lit goes to the stockholders of 
the firm. 
Alternatively, V(w + ~t/Nt-l) represents the firm1s mInImum value, i.e.,o 
when the entire organizational rent ~t goes to the skilled workers of the firm: 
that is, the N - 1 I{orkers employed at period t-l. V(w ) is a linear function of t t 
wt ' with VI (wt ) < 0. 2 Therefore the capitalized value of the firm can be 
represented as in Figure 1. 
2For given r, if the firm receives a fraction 8 of "t and skilled workers 
receive a fraction (1-8) of ~t' then V(wt ) = V(w ) + 8"t/(1 + r),o
and I~t = \~o + (1- 8) ~t/Nt-l' 
But 8"t = ~t - (I~t - w )Nt - 1· o
Therefore V(wt ) = V(w ) + [~t (w - w )N 1J (1 + r)t _o t o
= V(I~O) + ["t + \{oNt - 1] (1 + r) - [:''\-1/(1 + r)JI{t. 
;) 
-----------"--- \~t 
V(\~o + 1l"t/Nt_l) 
Bargaining Possibilities Frontier
 
FIGURE 1
 
The curve V(\\) represents the "bargaining possibilities frontier" \vhere skilled 
Horkers prefer points close to the \v't- a.,'(is Hhile stockholders prefer points 
close to the V- a.'(is . 
III. The Bargaining Process 
In the negotiation process for the determination of the Hage rate H (and,t 
therefore, the value of the firm V(\~t))' \"e assume that the "typical" skilled 
\wrker is guided by a von Neumann- ~Iorgenstern utility indicator UL I~i th \~age 
rate \~t as its sole argument, and \~e assume that UU\~t) > 0, UL(\~t) < O. 
Like\~ise, the manager of the firm is guided in the negotiation process by a 
von Neumann-Jlorgenstern utility indicator UM Ivith \~ealth V as its sole argument. 
In particular, \~e assume that the manager mms a fraction {i, 0 < {i ~ 1 of the 
firm, and that h~ holds financial assets in the amount of 1{F dollars, 1{F f O. 
Therefore, for a given \~age rate for skilled Ivorkers I~t, 1{ = 11'F + (l'V(\~t)' and 
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Differentiating (2) \{ith respect to \{t \;e obtain 
1{e assume that U~r(1{) > 0, U~i('{) < 0, and Uir'l ~ 0. 
We are now in a position to investigate the bargaining process which can 
yield a unique V and w. The process described is largely attributable to 
Zeuthen. Harsanyi has demonstrated that the Zeuthen solution to the bargaining 
problem is the Nash bargaining solution. The description of the process closely 
follows that given by Aoki. 
1{ages of skilled workers are determined at the beginning of each period by 
a bargaining process. The parties to the bargaining process are management and 
a representative skilled employee (Aoki, 1980, p. 604). At the beginning of the 
period each side must decide to acquiesce or bargain for a concession from the 
other side. If bargaining is undertaken each side understands that the other 
side may exercise its threat to withhold cooperation. 3 
The basis for negotiations is a wage rate \;t proposed by the manager, \;here 
W ~ w < W + r /N _1. Let w;_l be the wage rate that skilled workers wereo t o t t 
paid at period t-1. Then, the wage rate proposed by the manager, wt ' could be 
3 Harsanyi described the bargaining situation as follo\{s: "Bargaining situations 
with one possible threat by each party arise either when the two parties can 
achieve a certain gain by co-operation but when each of them can threaten to 
\vithhold his co- operation unless a profit- sharing agreement satisfactory to him 
is reached, or \{hen one or both parties are able to inflict one particular sort 
of positive damage on the other party and use the possibility as a threat .... 
But in more general situations the bargainin~ parties \{ill have a choice among 
several possible threats, each involving dif~erent degrees of non-cooperative or 
positively damaging behavior. Of course, if there is no obligation to carry out 
threats in the absence of agreement, the choice among alternative threats may
become trivial since each party may then use the mOSt formidable threat against 
his opponent as a matter of mere bluffing. To exclude this possibility, ~e may 
assume that each party is forced to carry out this threat if agreement fails." 
(llarsanyi, 1956, p. 146) 
less than w* - If so, the manager is essentially asking for a concession fromt 1 ' 
the skilled workers. Alternatively he could propose a wage equal to w* - thet 1 ' 
wage paid skilled workers in t-l. 
The skilled workers have two strategies. One consists of (a) accepting the 
1~age rate wt proposed by the manager; the other (b) rejecting wt and asking for 
an increase equal to h. With respect to the latter case, the manager has two 
strategy options. First, the manager can accept the workers' demand for an 
increase In wt by h, in which case the wage rate of skilled workers for period t 
1~ill be 1~t + hand, as a result, the capitalized value of the firm ,.;ill be V = 
- * Y(1~t + h), where Y < Y(wt ) = V. Alternatively, the manager can reject the 
workers I demand for an increase in wt by h. In this latter case, depending upon 
the workers' response, there are two possible outcomes. (a) The skilled workers 
can wi thdra1~ the ir demand. Then, the IVage rat e remains at 1~ t and the value of 
*the firm is V(wt ) = Y ; or (b) the skilled workers can insist on their demand 
resulting in either the IVorker or management withdrawing their cooperation. In 
this latter case, the wage rate that skilled ,;orkers can earn by seeking 
alternative employment will be 1~0 and the value of the firm 1~ill fall to yO, as 
the firm has to employ unskilled workers. 
If skilled workers m~~imize expected utility, they 1~ill enter negotiations, 
i.e., they will ask for a raise equal to h if their expected gain in utility is 
greater than their expected loss. More formally 
where Pl is labor's assessment of the probability that management 1~ill reject 
labor's demand and exercise its threat to withhold cooperation thereby resulting 
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1n a \,age of \'0. By rearranging terms, it follows that labor will go ahead Kith 
its demand for an increase in the wage rate by an increment equal to h if and 
only if: 
UL(Wt + h) - UL(wt )(5) 
UL(wt + h) - UL(w )o
In (5), P1* represents the m~ximum risk (m~ximum probability of conflict) that 
skilled workers are prepared to face in order to achieve the \.age increment h. 
In a similar manner, the manager will follow the second of the above t\.o 
strategies, i.e., he will reject the skilled workers' demand for an increase 1n 
the wage rate by h, if and only if, his expected gain is greater than his 
expected loss. More formally 
\.here P2 is the manager's assessment of the probability that skilled \wrkers 
will insist on their demand after such a demand has been rejected by the 
manager. Rearranging terms, (6) is equivalent to 
UM( ll'Y(\.t ) + 1vF) - U~I (ll'Y(\.t + h) + hiF) (7) 
U~I(aY(wt) + \VF) - UM(aYo + WF) 
*In (7), P2 1S the maximum risk of conflict that management can tolerate before 
accepting the workers' demand for an increase in wt by h. 
* the \.age increment, to arrive at the m~ximumDividing P1(\'t' h) by h, 
probability per h of conflict, and letting h approach zero, \.e arrive at LBt , a 
9 
commonly used measure of bargaining power consistent with Aokils measure of the 
employees' bargaining power. LB, at time t: 
UL(I,7t)
(8) LB =------­t UL(1,7t) - UL(1,70) 
*In a like manner, dividing P2(wt , h; a) by h, as h approaches zero the measure 
of management I s bargaining pOl,7er, 11m, at time t is: 
(9) 
Following Zeuthen, we l,7ill assume that labor and management have an 
accurate assessment of each others' resolve to bear the risk of conflict and 
that each party will make a concession l,7hen he finds that his opponent is 
prepared to bear a greater risk of conflict. 4 
Under our assumptions regarding strictly concave utility functions, it is 
clear that LBt is a decreasing function of l,7t Hhile ilmt is an increasing 
function of wt · Graphically the situation is represented as follows: 
~Zeuthen's behavioral assumption is formally derived In Harsanyi: p. 149-151. 
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Labor's and Management I s Bargaining POl~er Curves 
FIGURE 2 
If the manager proposes a \Vage rate smaller than IV* t , such as wi:, in the above 
diagram, LBt(wt,) > MBt(wi:,) and therefore skilled workers are prepared to bear a 
greater risk of conflict than management. In this case management concedes to 
labor I s demand for a higher \Vage rate. In a similar manner if skilled Iwrkers 
*rej ect the manager's proposal and demand a wage rate that is above I~t, such as 
\Vt , ~IBt (I~t) > LBt (I~t)' then management is prepared to bear a greater risk of 
conflict than skilled IVorkers. In this case the manager will reject the skilled 
lyorkers' demand for a higher IVage rate. It is only at a IVage rate IV = w* thatt t 
the resolve of each party to bear risk is equalized, i.e., MBt(w*) = LBt(w*).t t 
We will refer to w* as the equilibrium wage rate of the bargaining process, t 
and it will determine a unique point on the bargaining possibilities frontier 
together with the respective capitalized value of the firm as established in 
Figure 1. 5 
5As we show in the Appendix [A.l] the equilibrium wage obtained from this 
process corresponds precisely to the Nash Bargaining Solution. 
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IV. Introducing Outside Equity and the Manager's Bargaining Power 
IHth a descript ion of the bargaining process in hand, \.;e are nm.; in a 
position to describe how a sell off of a portion of the firm will affect the 
equilibrium position on the bargaining possibility frontier. Specifically, \.e 
\.;ill investigate how V and wt systematically change from a situation where the 
manager is 100% mmer to a situation where the manager sells off a portion of 
the firm to outsiders. 6 
Ivithout loss of generality we can assume that at the beginning of period t 
the owner-manager has no financial wealth, only firm-specific wealth, and 
further he owns 100% of the firm, i.e., a =1. Therefore, any financial wealth 
that enters his utility function must corne from a sale of a portion E, 
o < E < 1, of the firm. With a representing the portion of the firm retained by 
the manager, a + E = 1. 
Nmv, suppose that, faced with a demand by labor for an increase of the \.;age 
rate equal to h, the owner-manager considers selling a portion E of his interest 
in the firm to outsiders, thus, converting interest In the firm to financial 
assets. This conversion of interest in the firm to financial assets \.;ill 
involve some wealth costs that we assume to be a function of E and denote by 
C(E). I{e further assume that C(E) is continuous and t\.;ice differentiable for 
all E > O. 
It is intended that the function C(E) captures all \.;ealth costs that result 
from the transactions involved in converting interest in the firm to financial 
assets. In particular, \.;e assume that (a) the mmer- manager \.;ill be retained in 
his role as a manager under the new ownership structure of the firm at least for 
6The conclusions of this section \.;ill not be altered if the manager initially 
owned less than 100% of the firm. 
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the current period, and (b) acting in his o\{n best interests, his managerial 
tasks will include negotiating a wage rate with the skilled \.orkers. Therefore, 
in addition to any other costs, such as commissions paid to third parties and 
income t~xes on capital gains, it is intended that the cost function c(e) 
captures the agency costs considered by Jensen and Meckling (1976). It will be 
reasonable, then, to assume that 
(11) c (0) = 0; c (e) > 0, for e > 0; c' (e) ~ 0 and c" (e) ~ 0. 7 
Let V represent the market value of the firm at the beginning of period t, 
(a) before a wage rate for the skilled workers has been determined, and (b) 
exclusive of any wealth costs that are captured by the cost function c(·). 
Then, the net receipts from the sale of a portion e of the firm and, therefore, 
the manager IS financial \{ealth at period t will be 
An implication of (12) is that, for 0 < e ~ 1, the mmer-manager's wealth ,~ 
can have one of three possible values. If the manager accepts the skilled 
workers' demand, 
(13a) q(e) = aV(wt + h) + eV 
~ 
- c(e). 
If the manager rejects the skilled workers I demand and the skilled \wrkers 
withdraw such a demand, 
7According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 313), the \{ealth costs to the 
owner-manager will be increasing as his fractional ownership falls. Among the 
reasons given are: (a) the incentive of the manager to appropriate larger 
amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites, (b) costs for 
monitoring his behavior, and (c) his declining incentive to devote significant 
effort to "creative activities. I' To these reasons \.e can add that the 
owner-manager's decision to sell part of his interest in the firm may signal 
that there is trouble in the negotiation process with the employees. 
13 
~ 
(13b) 'V(E) = aY(\-lt) + EV - C(E). 
Finally, if the manager rejects the skilled workers' demand and negotiations 
break dmm, 
(13c) WO(E) = aVo + EV - C(E). 
Since V is independent of the wage rate that will prevail for period t, so 
is WF. Therefore, with the proper substitutions of equations (13a) , (13b), and 
(13c) into (6), the derivation of the manager's bargaining power at time t, ~IBt' 
in (9) remains valid. However, with (12), 'vF was seen to be a function of E. 
Utilizing (13b) and (13c) , \-le can \-lrite 
(14) 
As a preliminary to the general case, and in order to get an intuitive 
understanding of the process, let us suppose for a moment that there are no 
costs involved in selling a portion of the firm by the manager. In particular, 
let us suppose that Y = V(wt ). Then, from (13b) , W= Y(wt ), for any E, and from 
O(13c), W = aVo + EV(W t ). Substituting into (14) we obtain 
On the other hand, for a = 1, i.e., for E = 0, 
U~I (V (\-lt) )YI (wt ) 
UjI (V (\-l t)) - UM(V
o) 
In comparing the t~o, the case where a < 1, with the case where a = 1, it is 
easily seen (see Appendix [A.2J) that concavity of the utility function implies 
that 
U~l (Y (1,Tt) )YI (h't ) 
> ­
UJ1(Y(wt )) - UJI(eY(wt ) + aVo) Uj1 (Y(I,Tt)) - UM(Y
o) 
which means that the manager I s bargaining pOl,Ter all,Tays increases as he 
substitutes OImership interest in the firm l,Tith financial l,Tealth. 
,{ith Y = Y(wt ), and c(e) = 0, for all e, the manager would have nothing to 
lose by selling a portion of the firm. In fact, he could always guarantee 
himself a wealth level equal to Y(wt ) with certainty if he were to sell the 
entire firm. Therefore, l,Ti th free "insurance" in the event that negotiations 
break down, together with the assumption that he is retained to negotiate the 
l,age rate in his OIm best interest, the manager 1,0uld have nothing to lose by 
rejecting any demand for an increase in the wage rate. In particular, under the 
current assumptions of this preliminary case, the manager could impose any l,Tage 
rate, hO\,Tever low, as long as it exceeds the market wage rate w ' so that 
o 
skilled workers would prefer employment l,Tith the firm. 
Let us proceed now to examine the more realistic case where there are costs 
involved In selling off a portion of the firm as l,Te have assumed in (11), 
c(e) > 0. 
Note that, Wee) - WO(e) = a(Y(wt ) - yO). Therefore, multiplying both the 
numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of (14) by (Y(Ht ) - yO), 
setting U~I('{(e)) = b(e), (UjIC'{(e)) - UjI(wo(e)))/C'~T(e) - ,{o(e)) = B(e), and 
(-Y'(\,Tt)/(Y(I,Tt) - yo)) = A, \,Te can reHrite (14) as 
15
 
(15)
 
for any given wage rate wt In the relevant range. 
U 
ulanager' s Utility Funct ion 
FIGURE 3 
In (15), A is independent of E, while, In the graph of the manager's 
utility function, Figure 3, b(E) represents the slope at the wealth level '¥(E) , 
and B(E) represents the slope of the straight line joining the two points on the 
graph corresponding to ,¥o(E) and W(E), respectively. Therefore, for any given 
\;age rate wt in the relevant range, the manager's bargaining pOl;er is 
proportional [by a factor A =- VI (wt)/(V(wt ) - V
o)] to the ratio of the two 
slopes, b(E)/B(E). The slopes b and B represent the manager's feelings 
concerning changes in wealth. Specifically, b measures the manager's evaluation 
of small changes in wealth at 1¥(E) while B measures the manager1s evaluation of 
large changes in wealth over the range ,i to Vo. Recall that the manager's 
bargaining pm.er is determined by his att itude tOl;ard small gains and large 
losses. 
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Now, for a strictly concave utility function, b(E) < B(E), for any E such 
that 'V(E) > ,vo(E). In particular, if for E = 0, I,e I,rite V(wt ) = 'v(O) , and 
Va = HO(0), then \{ (0) > HO(0), so, if the manager does not sell any port ion of 
the firm, his bargaining p01,er is A(b (0) IB (0)) < A. On the other hand as E 
tends to 1, both W(E) and 'vo(E) tend to the same certain wealth of (\1_ c(l)), 
~ ~ 
which implies that b(E) tends to UiI(V - c(1)), and B(E) tends to U~I(V - c(l)) 
[see Appendix (A.3)]. Therefore, as the manager comes closer and closer to 
selling the entire firm, i.e., as E tends to 1, b(E)/B(E) tends to 1, and MBt(E) 
tends to A. 
've have established that as the olmer- manager tends to be a pure manager, 
i.e., as E tends to 1, his bargaining po\,er will be greater than in the case 
where he retains ownership of the entire firm, i.e., for the case where E = O. 
The question is whether we can obtain a similar result for intermediate cases of 
o < E < 1. 
Observe that, for E > 0, the wealth functions In (13b) and (13c) are 
differentiable. Therefore, for E > 0, 
fJ\{ 
(16) 'v r (E) = -
OE 
= V - V(wt ) - c' (E), and 
(17) ,yO I (E) 
O\vo 
= - = V - VO - c' (E) . 
oE 
~ 
Proposition 1: Assume that either HO, (E) ~ - HI(E) > 0, or HOI (E) > - HI (E) ~ 
0, for all E > 0. Then, MBt(E) is an increasing function of E, E > O. 
The results of Proposition 1 [see Appendix (A.4) for proof] in conjunction 
\,i th the previous results that j1I\ (0) < A and 'IB (E) tends to A as E tends to 1,t 
are sufficient to establish proposition 2. 
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ProDosition 2. Assume that either WOI (E) ~ - W' (E) > 0, or ~Ol (E) > - W' (E) ~ 
- <­0, for all E > 0. Then there exists an E, °= E < 1, such that JIBt (E) > JIB t (0) , 
-for all E > E. 
This establishes that a sufficiently large sell-off by the manager "ill 
increase his bargaining po\{er. Sufficient conditions for this result are that: 
(a) the sell-off increases wealth in the event of a breakdown in negotiations 
and reduces or leaves wealth unchanged "hen negotiations are successful; and (b) 
the gain in \{ealth under a breakdmm in negotiations exceeds the loss in \{ealth 
"hen negotiations are successful. 
This condition may be interpreted (as in the preliminary case ,{here costs 
were assumed to be zero) as a form of insurance in the event that negotiations 
break do\m. The "cost of insurance ll in the present case ,{QuId be -V' (E), the 
reduct ion In \{ealth of the manager under the best- case outcome \{hen labor 
concedes. The protection he receives, in the event that negotiations break down 
is VO I (E) . Hence, our results here are similar to those ,{hen '.-e assumed no 
costs. The bargaining po\{er of the manager Increases as long as the protection 
he receives in the event of a strike exceeds the cost of his lIinsurance." 
-Unless E = ° in Proposition 2, a sell-off of a small portion of the firm, 
E < E may lower the manager's bargaining po,.-er. The reason is the presence of 
lump-sum costs. Suppose for a moment that lump-sum costs of ~ are incurred when 
the manager sells part of his equity. Then from (12), as E approaches 0, the 
proceeds from the sale approach °\.-hile costs approach ~. Hence, regardless of 
the outcome of negotiations, the manager's wealth is less than it ,{ould have 
been under no sale of equity. As a consequence, even though by Proposition 1, 
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the manager I S bargaining pm,er is an increas ing funct ion of E: for E > 0, there 
may be a range of E such that ~IBt (E) stays belm, ~IB.t (0). This occurs because 
the manager's wealth is now lower due to the lump-sum cost c. 8 Clearly since 
lump sum costs lm,er the manager's bargaining pOl,er only when a sell- off makes 
the manager unambiguously worst off, it is safe to assume that such an outcome 
would be unlikely. 
In the absence of lump-sum costs ~IBt(E) > ~IBt(O). More formally the 
following proposition is valid. 
ProDosition 3. Assume that (a) there are no lump-sum costs and (b) either 
'io , (E) f {i' (E) > 0 or 'io , (E) > - ,i ' (E) f 0 for all E > o. Then ~IBt(E) > MBt(o) , 
for all E > O. 
In conjunction with Proposition 1, Proposition 3 implies that the manager's 
bargaining power increases as he sells a larger share of the firm and is always 
larger than when he retains full ownership. 
Let's now turn our attention to the effects of a sell-off on the value of 
the firm. The propositions above establish that under general conditions a 
sell-off of the firm will, for any given I,age rate, increase the manager's 
bargaining pmver. This means that a sell- off I,ill shift the MB t curve 
(initially presented in Figure 2) towards the northwest as depicted in Figure 4. 
-8~rathematically the function ~IBt(E) is not differentiable at E = 0 if c > o. 
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Recall from Section III ~ that the equilibrium l>1age is established at the 
l>1age which equal izes the manager I s and labor I s bargaining pmier. Hence the 
sell-off I>1hich shifts the MB curve northl>1est to MBi' results in a lowered t 
equilibrium wage of w* '. Stockholders no,~ capture a larger portion of the t 
organizational rent, and as a result the value of the firm increases. 
v. Conclusions 
In this paper we have demonstrated that the introduction of outside equity 
In an ol>1ner-managed firm can increase its value. The introduction of outside 
equity, even at a cost, serves as insurance for the manager in the event that 
negotiations break dOl>1n. Since he no longer bears the entire cost, the 
OImer- manager is more willing to risk a breakdOlm in negotiations to achieve 
'~age concessions from skilled labor. Labor perceives this, and accepts a 10l~er 
Our assumptions preclude the possibility that the ne,~ stockholders are the 
current employees of the firm. An interesting extension 1>10uld be to examine hOI>1 
the results reported here are altered if labor purchases a portion of the firm. 
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Appendix 
*[A.1] To establish that the equilibrium wage rate wt obtained by setting 
MB = LB is the same as that obtained from the Nash bargaining solution,t ,t 
consider the first order condition for the maximization of the product 
(Uil1 (aV(I.r ) + 'iF) - Uil1(aVo + 'iF))· (UL(I.r ) - UL(I.rO)) with respect to wt · t t 
Differentiating this product l.rith respect to wt and setting it equal to 0 l,Te 
obtain: U~l(aV(wt) + WF) (aV' (l.r )) (UL(w ) - UL(I,TO)) + (UiIl(aV(wt ) + WF) - UiIl(aVo +t t 
'iF))·Ui,(I.r ) = o. So, at the l,Tt * that solves this equation,t 
* * * Ui,( wt ) aU~l (aY(Wt ) + 'iF) V' (1,1 t) 
* = * 0UL(I.r ) - UL(w ) UilI (aV(I,Tt) + 'iF) - UiIl(aY + Wt o F) 
[A.2] To prove that 
----------- > ­
UiIl(V(w )) - UiIl(EY(W ) + aVo) Uil1(V(w )) - UiIl(Vo)t t t 
multiply the nominator and denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side of 
this inequality by a. This will equalize the nominators of the tlvO fractions 
and will make the denominator of the second equal to a(Uil1 (V(I,Tt)) - UiIl(Vo)). 
Note that by the strict concavity of UiIl , UM(EY(I,Tt) + aVo) > EUil1(V(w )) +t 
aUilI(Vo). Since E = 1-a, UiIl(EY(w ) + aVo) > UjI (V(I,Tt)) - a(Uil1 (V(I.r )) - UM(Vo)),t t 
\.rhich implies that a(UiIl (V(I.r )) - UiIl(Vo) > Uil1(V(w )) - Uil1 (EV(W ) + aVo), lvhicht t t 
completes the proof. 
[A.3] To show that, as E ~ 1, (b(E)/B(E)) ~ 1, observe that, as E ~ 1, 
both the nominator and the denominator of B(E) tend to 0, so that B(E) tends to 
the indeterminate form (0/0). However, 
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limit (U~[(I{(E))I{' (E) - U~[(Iyro(E))IyrO, (E)) = u~[6r - c(l))(I{' (1) - HOI (1)) 
E -; 1 
limit (I{ I (E) - IyrO, (E)) = (I{ I (1) - HOI(1) ) . 
E -; 1 
But from (16) and (17), ('{' (E) - 'VOl (E)) = ­ (V(wt ) - VO) *0, for all E > 0. 
Therefore, 
By L'Hospitalls rule about indeterminate forms (0/0), 
limit B(E) = U~[ (V 
~ 
- c (1)) = b(1) . 
E -; 1 
[A.4] To prove that under the conditions of Proposition 1, the function 
MBt(E) is an increasing function of E, note that for E > 0, both functions b(E) 
and B(E) are differentiable. Therefore, differentiating (15) with respect to E 
we obtain 
bl (E)B(E) - b(E)B'(E)
 
MBi(E) = A (B(E))2
 
where primes denote first derivatives of the respective functions. Note that 
A > 0, and B(E) > 0, so, sign (MBi(E)) = sign (b l (E)B(E) - b(E)BI (E)). 
~ ~ ~ 
By definition, b(E) = U~[(V(E)), and this implies that b' (E) = UiI(V(E))'v ' (E) 
~ ~ 
b
,,,here, by assumption, U"nv(E)) < 0. Therefore, b l (E) > °if 'v' (E) < 0, and 
l (E) = 0 if WI (E) = 0. Also by definition, B(E) = U~[(\{(E)) - UM(Ho(E)))/(\{(E) 
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A 
- WO(E)) > ° (see [1.3J). Since W' (E) ~ 0, it follows that b l (E)B(E) > °if 
~ A A 
WI (E) < 0, and b l (E)B(E) = °if W' (E) = 0. As a consequence, (a) if WI (E) < 0, 
then, MBt(E) > °provided that - b(E)B' (E) ~ 0, and (b) if WI (E) = 0, then MBt(E) 
> °provided that -b(E)B I(E) > 0. 
Differentiate B(E) with respect to E to obtain 
B' (E) = 
U~I (1{ (E) ),i I(E) - U~I (1,ro (E) ),,r0' (E) ) (,i (E)- WO(E) )- (Uj [ (W (E) )- UilI (1,ro (E) ) ) ('{' (E) - ,,r0' (E) ) 
(,i(E) - ,,ro(E))2 
Factoring out the term (WI (E) - WOI (E))/W(E) - wO(E)), and making use of the 
definition of B(E), B' (E) can be written as 
B' (E) 
A 
From (16) and (17), (,,r' (E) - ,,r0' (E)) = - (\,(\,Tt) - yO), a negative number, 
Hhile from the conditions of Proposition 1, WI (E) ~ 0, and ,,r0, (E) > 0. 
Define 6(E) = - ,,r0, (E)/(,i' (E) - WOI (E)), so (l-6(E)) = ,if (E)/6{1 (E) ­
WOI (E)). Then, 1/2 ~ 6(E) ~ 1, for each E. In particular, if WI (E) = 0, 6(E) = 
1, while if WI (E) < 0, 6(E) ~ 1/2 (which follows from the conditions of 
Proposition 1). Substituting 6(E) and 1-6(E) for the corresponding terms In 
B' (E) yields 
NOI,T UiI(',r) is a convex function (i.e., U~I(1V) < 0, and U~II r (W) ~ 0). 
Therefore 
[U~r(I~(E)) + 1/2(Uir(liO(E)) - U~1(1{(E)))J (1{(E) - l{o(E)) ~ (l\l(l~i(E)) ­
U (1{0 (E) ) ) . ill 
That is, the area under the straight line that connects any two different points 
on the graph of Uir(V) is at least as great as the area under the graph between 
those points. 
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by (W(E) - l{o(E)), a positive 
number for E < 1, we obtain 
~ 
U~I(1{(E)) + 1/2(UiI(I{0(E)) - U~I(E))) ~ 
Uill (1\ (E) ~ 
W( E) 
_ UjI (1{o (E) ) 
- VO (E) 
=B(E). 
HOIv'ever, 
Therefore, if WI (E) < 0, b(E) ~ 1/2, and 
UiI(I{(E)) + 8(E)(U~I(1{0(E)) - U~I(I{(E)) ~ B(E), 
which implies that BI (E) ~ 0, while, if 1{1 (E) = 0, 8(E) = 1, and 
~ 
,~hich implies that BI (E) < 0. lEth b(E) = U~r(V(E)) > 0, it fo1101vs that 
-b(E)B' (E) ~ ° if WI (E) < 0, and -b(E)B 
' 
(E) >°if ~I (E) = 0, which completes 
the proof. 
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